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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900284-CA
Priority No. 2

MICHAEL SAMUEL WEAVER,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Michael Samuel Weaver relies on his
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts.
Appellant replies to the State's brief as follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
No court in this state has held that state constitutional
arguments will be considered only after "concern" has been expressed
with the federal analysis.

The federal and state constitutional

arguments must be considered separately.

Under either analysis,

probable cause did not exist.
The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable because the questioned affidavit was conclusory and
lacked sufficient information.

The State has not met its burden of

proving that the exception applies under either constitution.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE S3EARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT DID NOT ESTABLISH
PROBABLE CAUSE.
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
A.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
SEPARATELY UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

In its brief, the State chose not to analyze Appellant
Weaver's argument under the Utah Constitution.
brief at 8-12.

Appellee's

Instead, the State relied upon only a federal

analysis, reasoning:
Defendant analyzes his challenge to the trial
court's probable cause determination separately under
the United States and the Utah Constitutions, based on
his interpretation of State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460
(Utah 1990). Larocco involves warrantless searches
and expresses concern felt by the Utah Supreme Court
with the direction federal law is moving on that
issue. The courts of this state have never expressed
a similar concern about the Gates totality-of-the
circumstances test. In fact, this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have specifically adopted and applied
that test.
Appellee's brief at 8 (emphasis in original).
Appellate courts in Utah may have adopted and applied the
"totality-of-the-circumstances" test, but the decisions cited by the
State did not preclude a different analysis under the Utah
Constitution.

See Appellee's brief at 8 (citing State v. Brown, 143

Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d
1258, 1261 (Utah 1983); and State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101
(Utah 1985)).

But cf. State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 n.l

(Utah App. 1989).

- 2

-

In State v, Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court set forth the appropriate guidelines for making a
state constitutional argument.

Such arguments will be addressed

only where, as here, the defendant has made a separate analysis:
We note that neither the State nor defendant has
discussed or relied independently on article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, . . . . We
therefore have treated this case solely under the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and
have relied only on federal law. We have not
considered separate state constitutional standards,
even though we are aware that other states are relying
with increasing frequency on an analysis of the
provisions of their own constitutions to expand
constitutional protection beyond that mandated by the
United States Supreme Court.
Earl, 716 P.2d at 805 (emphasis added).
Besides noting the trend of other jurisdictions, the Earl
Court encouraged Utah attorneys to address criminal issues under the
Utah Constitution:
[D]espite our willingness to independently
interpret Utah's constitution in other areas of the
law, the analysis of state constitutional issues in
criminal appeals continues to be ignored. It is
imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on
relevant state constitutional questions. We cite with
approval the summary of scholarly commentary and
analytic technique set forth by the Supreme Court of
Vermont in State v. Jewett. Vt., 500 A.2d 233 (1985).
716 P.2d at 806 (citations omitted); see also State v. Larocco, 794
P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990) ("An increasing number of state courts are
relying on an analysis of the search and seizure provisions of their
own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional protection
beyond the scope mandated by the fourth amendment"); State v.
Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985) ("Since 1970 there have been

- 3
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over 250 cases in which state appellate courts have viewed the scope
of rights under state constitutions as broader than those secured by
the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme
court").
Hence, unlike the cases cited by the State, see Appellee's
brief at 8 (none of which set forth a different analysis under the
Utah Constitution), the approach taken in the case at bar discusses
a different state constitutional standard.1

See generally

Appellant's opening brief at 21-25.

1

Justice Durham has suggested three different models for
state constitutional arguments. Durham, Employing the Utah
Constitution in the Utah Courts, Utah B. J. 25, 26 (November 1989)
(hereinafter referred to as "Employing the Utah Constitution")
(attached as Addendum A ) . Under the "primacy" approach, "a state
court looks first to state constitutional law, develops independent
doctrine and precedent, and decides federal questions only when
state law is not dispositive." The "interstitial" approach "reaches;
a state claim only after determining that federal doctrine does not
protect the claimed right." And under the "lockstep" approach, "a
state decides that when its own constitutional language and the
language of the federal constitution are identical or similar, the
two should mean what the United States Supreme Court says they
mean." Id.
Michael Weaver advocates the primacy model, cf. Linde,
E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev.
165 (Winter 1984), and the interstitial model under appropriate
circumstances. Cf. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (N.J. 1982)
(Handler, J., concurring) (state law [City of Price v. Jaynes, 113
Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606, 609 (1948)] predating United States Supreme
Court decisions [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)]); see infra
note 2. The State apparently advocates the lockstep model, an
approach "raising what one commentator has described as the problem
of the 'vanishing constitution.'" Durham, Employing the Utah
Constitution at 27 (citing Collins, Reliance on State
Constitutions—The Montana Disaster, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1095, 1111
(1985). The lockstep approach was also implicitly rejected by State
v. Larocco, 794 P«2d 460 (Utah 1990), as the Court there made a
separate state constitutional analysis even though the federal and
state clauses were virtually identical. See id. at 467 n.l.
-[Footnote continued on next page]- 4

-

As the preceding authority suggests, a state constitutional
argument may be considered in a number of circumstances, and not
only when courts "express concern" with federal law.
brief at 8.

Appellee's

Appellant Weaver's state constitutional argument should

be considered more broad than, and independent from, the federal
analysis.2
B.

PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT EXIST

The State argues generally3 that "probability, not a prima
facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable

1 [cont'd]
The three models suggest only the process for
addressing state constitutional arguments (i.e. when to address the
arguments). Once the model is chosen, the substantive techniques of
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, (Vt. 1985), may then be considered
(i.e. how to address the arguments). See Durham, Employing the Utah
Constitution at 27 (citing six types of arguments advanced by one
author: the historical, the textual, the doctrinal, the prudential,
the structural, and the ethical).
2

"Prior reliance on federal precedent and federal
constitutional provisions [does] not preclude us from taking a more
expansive view of [the state constitution] where the United States
Supreme Court determines to further limit federal guarantees in a
manner inconsistent with our prior pronouncements." State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Jackson,
102 Wash.2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41 (1984)); see supra note 1.
3

The State also questions defendant Weaver's standing on
appeal. Appellee's brief at 11 n.l. "[T]he state should not be
allowed to raise standing for the first time on appeal." State v.
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 886 (Utah App. 1990). During the motion to
suppress, the State did not attempt to establish that Michael Weaver
had no expectation of privacy. At most, the State showed that
Weaver shared access to the shed with his mother or stepbrother.
(MS 22). However, a shared privacy interest in a locked shed would
not strip Weaver, one of only two individuals with access to the
key, of his standing to contest the seizure. See Appellant's
opening brief at 12 n.5. Moreover, besides the procedural
deficiency, Michael Weaver's privacy interest (relevant only to
standing) would have had no bearing on the nexus alleged by Ms.
Powell. See Appellant's opening brief at 11 n.4.
- 5

-

cause for issuance of a search warrant."
(citation omitted).

Appellee's brief at 9

The State also contends that Michael Weaver has

made a "hypertechnical analysis" which should be rejected.
Appellee's brief at 11.

For clarity, Appellant Weaver will simplify

his arguments.
A probability of criminal activity is not established when
a son makes five or six trips to his mother's house (especially when
the son "frequented his mother's residence, which was only . . . 40
or 50 yards from where he was living").
at 15.

Appellant's opening brief

Perhaps the outcome may have been different if the "criminal

activity" (the visits) occurred on May 7, 1989, the day of the
crime.

However, because the questioned activity did not arise until

four or five days later, May 11, 1989, a parolee suspected of a
crime and subjected to a search at any time would not keep stolen
property in his possession for that length of time before deciding
to move it. Appellant's opening brief at 13, 17-18; cf. Powers'
Affidavit, page 3 (even Detective Powers acknowledged "that Weaver,
being on Intense Supervised Parole, would not keep stolen property
at his primary residence knowing that such a place could and is
routinely searched by Parole Officers").

The very nature of

Weaver's status reduced entirely any probability of criminal
activity.
Acting on nothing more than a hunch, Detective Powers
stated his conclusions in the affidavit.

It is important to note

that the Detective had already suspected Weaver and wanted to search
his house before speaking with Sally Powell.

- 6 -

(T 55-56).

Once

Ms. Powell informed Powers that Weaver had also "frequented" his
mother's residence (Carol Ahlstrom), Powers decided to expand the
targeted search area.

(T 55-56).

Detective Powers simply concluded

that any place frequented by Weaver should be searched.

Probable

cause did not exist under the federal constitution.
Alternatively, the Court in City of Price v. Jaynes, 113
Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948), expressed an even more restrictive
test for magistrates considering unreasonable searches or seizures.
There, the Court condemned undefined standards (of which the
"totality of the circumstances" is one) because "[t]his leaves the
tests too much in the air and dependent in each case on what the
magistrate hearing the case may within the light of his very limited
or plenary knowledge conclude to be reasonable or unreasonable."
191 P.2d at 609; see Appellant's opening brief at 19-25.
By using an objective analysis such as the "two pronged"
test4 of Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the probable cause determination
would not vary with the individual knowledge of a given magistrate.
The two pronged test will remain more consistent than the

4

"Many states, for example, have interpreted 'probable
cause
in
their
own search and seizure provisions under the old
9
Aguilar-Spinelli' standard, now rejected by the [United States]
Supreme Court in favor of an ad-hoc 'totality of the circumstances'
test. E.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548,
556 (1985); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984);
People v. Sherbine. 421 Mich. 502, 364 N.W.2d. 658 (1984)[.]" noted
in Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases; A Report
from the Provinces, 2 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law
275, 279 (1989).
7

- 7

-

subjective, easily manipulated "totality of the circumstances"
analysis.

See Appellant's opening brief (wherein the veracity and

basis of knowledge prongs were disputed); see also Illinois v.
Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 274-91 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
POINT II
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)
The State's reliance on the "good faith" exception is
inapplicable in the case at bar.

Because the contested affidavit

contained insufficient information and conclusory statements, see
Appellant's opening brief at 11-16, the good faith exception cannot
nullify the effect of the exclusionary rule.
brief at 13 n.7.

Appellant's opening

The State did not sustain its burden of proving

that the exception applies.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186

(Utah 1987).
Assuming, arguendo, the federal analysis would allow such
an exception, the Utah Constitution is not as accommodating.5

As

stated recently by the Utah Supreme Court, "We now expressly hold
that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary
consequence of police violations of article I, section 14." State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990).

5

If the police officers

Other jurisdictions have rejected the Leon "good faith
exception" based on their own state constitutional or statutory
provisions. E.g., People v. Bicrelow. 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985);
State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); State v. Carter, 370
S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); State v. Morrissev, 577 A.2d 1060 (Conn.
1990).
- 8
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here illegally obtained evidence pertaining to Michael Weaver, it
must necessarily be excluded.

Id.

Since the State has not provided

a "good faith exception" analysis under the Utah Constitution, it
has not fulfilled its burden of proof.

Cf. State v. Mendoza, 748

P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Weaver respectfully
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial with an order excluding the illegally obtained evidence.
SUBMITTED this D&

day of December, 1990.

IEN STAM
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

7?^^
RONALD S.v FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 2v

day of December, 1990.

"RK

g. fn^

RONALD S. F-U^INO

DELIVERED by

this

of December, 1990.
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Employing the Utah Constitution
in the Utah Courts
By Associate Justice Christine M. Durham
Utah Supreme Court
These comments deal with what Justice
Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court
has referred to as "the original logic of the
federal system."
It once again is becoming familiar
learning that the federal bill of rights
was drawn from the earlier state declarations of rights adopted at the time
of independence, that most protection
of people's rights against their own
states entered the federal constitution
only in the Reconstruction amendments of the 1860s, and that it took
another 100 years and much disputed
reasoning to equate most of the first
eight amendments with due process
under the 14th.
My own view has long been that a
state court always is responsible for
the law of its state before deciding
whether the state falls short of a
national standard, so that properly no
federal issue is reached when the
state's law protects the claimed
right...The right question is not
whether a state's guarantee is the
same or broader than its federal
counterpart as interpreted by the
ni_:*

i c*

— n~„-+

TU«

CHRISTINE DURHAM is an Associate Justice of the
Utah Supreme Court. She was appointed to that court
by Gov. Scott Matheson in 1981, after serving for
several years on Utah s general jurisdiction trial court.
As a trial judge, she was President of the Utah District
Judges Association and Presiding Judge for the Third
Judicial District in Salt Lake County. Before coming to
the bench. Justice Durham practiced law in North
Carolina and in Salt Lake City, and was an adjunct
professor at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University.
Justice Durham has been active in professional and
community service. She presently is a member of the
Education Committee of the ABA's Judicial Administration Division and serves on the Utah Judicial Council's Committee on Judicial Performance Evaluation.
She was educated at Wellesley College and the Duke
University School of Law.
Justice Durham has taught on the subject of State
Constitutional Law at the ABA's Appellate Judges*
Seminars and will be teaching a seminar on the subject
at the University of Utah College ofLaw during spring
semester 1989.

right question is what the state's guarantee means and how it applies to the
case at hand.1
The Utah Supreme Court has been criticized for "inconsistency" and "indecision"
in its approach to state constitutional analysis,2 and the criticism is to some extent
justified.
In the recent past, the Utah Sunrpmp Pnnrt hac hf>rr\rr\t> u/illino tn

independently interpret Utah's constitution in settling a broad range of
questions. For instance, the Court has
developed arightof access to preliminary hearings under the Utah Constitution not recognized in the federal
constitution. The Court has held iiat
the right of parents to maintain the
parent-child relationship is fundamental under the Utah Constitution.
The Court has developed a separation
of powers doctrine under the siate
constitution that prohibits branche.; of
state government from encroaching
on the primary functions of coordinate branches. It has interpreted
Utah's Uniform Operation of the
Laws provision to invalidate Utah's
guest statutes. The Court broadened,
and then recently contracted, protection against self-incrimination aviilable under the Utah Constitution.
Further, the Utah court has found
fewer standing requirements under
the Utah Constitution than under the
federal constitution.
Although the Utah Supreme Court
actively looks to Utah's constitution,
its decisions are uneven. The Court
has not developed a consistent ap«rr»a^n fr*r r?»c^c in \i/hi/-»n krtth ctat*»

d federal constitutional claims are
ide. Some cases fully examine dif•ences between the Utah and United
ates provisions; others rely exclu'ely on federal law although state
tims were presented.3
e responsibility for this unevenness in
>ach does not lie entirely with the
., however. State constitutional prois are occasionally entirely overlooked
unsel, frequently cited only in passing,
'ery rarely subjected to the kind of
il briefing and analysis that is helpful
; development of doctrine and preceThe Court has even resorted on occato deploring this circumstance in its
:n opinions:
We note.. .that despite our will*ness to independently interpret
ah's constitution in other areas of
i law, the analysis of state contutional issues in criminal appeals
ntinues to be ignored
It is imrative that Utah lawyers brief this
)urt on relevant state constitutional
estions
We cite with approval
e summary of scholarly comsntary and analytic technique set
rth by the Supreme Court of VerDnt in State v. /eweft, Vt., 500 A.2d
3 (1985).4 •
e Court needs the help of lawyers to
to fill the scholarly void surrounding
interesting questions of state cononal law. I offer here some relatively
>m observations about how the process
> unfold and what resources may be
tble to creative lawyers.
ree different models for state constituanalysis have emerged in the literaind case law: (1) the "primacy" ap- ,
h; (2) the "interstitial" or supplemen)proach; and (3) the "lockstep" aph. Under the primacy approach, faby Justice Linde and the Oregon court,
: court looksfirstto state constitutional
develops independent doctrine and
dent, and decides federal questions
#hen state law is not dispositive.
The answer [to the question of
>at the state's constitutional guaranmeans] may turn out the same as
would under federal law. The
te's law may prove to be more
)tectivc than federal law. The state
/ also may be less protective. In
X case the Court must go on to
:ide the claim under federal law,
uming it has been raised.5
z interstitial approach, frequently foli by the New Jersey Supreme Court,
es a state claim only after determining
ederal doctrine does not protect the
ed right. It is subject to the criticism
s use may be result-oriented and there- j

fore unprincipled. One response to that
criticism is the development of criteria to
justify divergence, such as those articulated
by Justice Handler in his concurring opinion
in State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (N.J.
1982), adopted by a unanimous court in
State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641 (N.J.
1983). The seven Hunt criteria that justify a
result different from one reached by the
United States Supreme Court are (1) textual
differences in the federal and state constitutions; (2) "legislative history" for the
state provision indicating a broader meaning
than that given the federal language; (3)
state law predating United States Supreme
Court decisions; (4) differences in federal
m and state constitutional structures; (5) subject matter of particular-state or local interest; (6) particular state history or traditions;
and (7) public attitudes in the state.6
Thus, the New Jersey approach
treats the Supreme Court's reasoning
and result as presumptively correct
for state constitutional analysis. As a
result of this presumption, the state
court is compelled to explain, in terms
of the identified criteria, why it is not
following the Supreme Court precedent. A constitutional interpretation
"that will stand the test of detached
criticism" is not enough. Justification
in this manner raises several critical
issues: (1) Is disagreement over sub-

stantive constitutional interpretation
illegitimate? (2) Does the persuasive
power of Supreme Court decisions
depend upon the Court's institutional
position or the soundness of its
reasoning? Since the New Jersey view
places a high value on the institutional
aspect of constitutional interpretation
at the expense of independent state
constitutional jurisprudence, it is
submitted that this approach attributes
too much to Supreme Court decisions.7
The third model can be described as
"lockstep" practice, whereby a state decides
that when its own constitutional language
and the language of the federal constitution
are identical or similar, the two should mean
what the United States Supreme Court says
they mean. The Montana Supreme Court
recently reached such a conclusion.
The language used in the two constitutions is substantially identical and
affords no basis for interpreting Montana's prohibition against self-incrimination more broadly than its federal
counterpart...
Moreover, this Court has expressly
held to the contrary. "The Montana
constitutional guarantee affords no
greater protection than that of the federal constitution." State v. Armstrong, supra, 552 P.2d at 619. A year
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What can the Russell System do for your clients' retirement investments?
Just what it does for 40 top corporations...
Go for higher return with lower risk long-term.
The Frank Russell Investment Management Co.—asset management consultant to IBM, General Motors,
Xerox and 37 other leading companies—uses a unique multi-style multiZIONS
manager system to increase long-term investment return and decrease risk.
Russell investment strategies for companies and individuals are now
FIRST NATIONAL
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later, we relied on this statement in
Armstrong and further held, u[t]he
opinions of the United States Supreme Court, therefore, delineate the
maximum breadth of the privilege
against self-incrimination in Montana." State v. Finley, supra, 566
P.2dat 1121.1
Under this approach, a state supreme
court cedes to the United States Supreme
Court all interpretive powers with respect to
the language in question, raising what one
commentator has described as the puzzling
problem of the "vanishing constitution.*''
Utah, like many other states, has never
explicitly adopted any one (but has at times
used each) of the foregoing analytic models
for state constitutional analysis, and lawyers
should think about the policy implications
of each approach in structuring state constitutional claims. Lawyers should also consider how basic principles of constitutional
construction may be brought to bear on state
constitutional claims.
Consider Philip Bobbitf s six types
of argument; the historical, the textual, the doctrinal, the prudential, the
structural and the ethical...

Each of the six types of arguments
may call for a different decision in one
state from another state andfromdecisions under the United States Constitution.10
This forum does not permit an extended
discussion of the ways in which each of the
foregoing arguments might be utilized in a
Utah constitutional case. A reference to this
Court's opinion in American Fork v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985), however, will illustrate an interesting interplay
between "textual,*' "historic" and "prudential" considerations in the context of
article I, Sect. 12 of the Utah Constitution.
The Vermont Supreme Court included a
useful discussion of interpretive factors in
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985). In
that case, the Vermont court summarized its
view of the obligations and opportunities of
lawyers practicing before it:
This generation of Vermont lawyers has an unparalleled opportunity
to aid in the formulation of a state
constitutional jurisprudence that will
protect the rights and liberties of our
people, however the philosophy of
the United States Supreme Court may

ebb and flow. In his correspordence
with George Wythe, John Adams
summed up this kind of historic time:
"You and I, dear friend, have been
sent into life at a time when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have
wished to live."11
Utah lawyers have a similar op x>rtuni
to assist in the evolution of arichand ever
ful state constitutional history. May v
judges and lawyers take mutual aivantaj
of it.
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